We aim to investigate the evolution of simple conditional
response strategies in a cooperative environment. We start by defining
properties of response function types in a general theoretical framework.
Then we analyze the evolutionary stability of response strategies in a
mixed population by using simulations based on an extended repeated prisoners
Aligned with game theoretical literature our results confirm that the pure selfish type is likely to dominate the population when the discount factor is sufficiently low while two distinct conditional cooperator types are most likely types to survive when repetition probability is sufficiently high.
However, our result show that, being a counter intuitive strategy, a particular hump-shaped response strategy is the most successful conditional strategy in the population for some mediate values of discount factor. Our result provide an intuition to explain the consistent existence of hump shaped responses obvesred in several experimental studies.
Keywords: evolution, cooperation, reciprocity, conditional cooperation
JEL Classification: C72; C73
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